Introduction

This analysis was prepared as it becomes increasingly apparent that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine – a violation of international law – is moving closer to a realistic peace settlement. Russia's military and economic position has deteriorated dramatically since 2022: on the Russian side, human and material resources are dwindling steadily, while Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience – stabilized front lines through technological drone superiority, targeted and effective strikes deep into the Russian hinterland targeting energy infrastructure and refineries that deal a severe blow to the oil sector as the Kremlin's central revenue source, and symbolically significant operations such as the disruption of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. All these developments increase the likelihood of serious peace negotiations with each passing month.

This changing situation raises concrete questions for investors: What does a possible end to the war mean economically for Russia and for Ukraine? Which markets offer better opportunities? Which countries and companies will benefit from reconstruction? This analysis provides answers – sober, data- and fact-based, and without political judgment.

Table of Contents

Ch. 1–6   Economic Assessment of the War
Territorial land gains, land value, war costs, and economic cost-benefit ratio from a Russian perspective

Ch. 7      Impact on GDP and the Economy
GDP development pre-war vs. war years, labor force losses, counterfactual growth scenario, economic setback in years

Ch. 8      Impact on the Stock Market and Companies in Russia
MOEX index development 2020–2026, P/E and P/B ratios, corporate earnings by sector, outlook after the war ends

Ch. 9–10  Potential Stock Market and Investment Winners After the War
Ukraine reconstruction as Europe's greatest investment opportunity, opportunity comparison Ukraine vs. Russia, beneficiary countries – with a special focus on Austria and Germany

Preface

R&B Wealth Management regards the loss of every human life on both sides of this conflict as the greatest tragedy Europe has experienced in the 21st century. The following analysis is a sober economic assessment – it cannot, however, capture the immeasurable human suffering this war has left on both sides.

1. Territory Gained

Russia currently controls (as of spring 2026) approximately 116,310 km² of Ukrainian territory – equivalent to 19.3% of Ukraine's total area. Of this, approximately 44,000 km² was already controlled before February 24, 2022 (Crimea: ~27,000 km² + parts of Donbas: ~17,000 km²). The net gain since the full-scale invasion amounts to approximately 72,000 km².

Key Figure	Value
Total controlled territory (current)	116,310 km²
Converted to square meters	116,310,000,000 m²
Controlled before Feb. 2022 (Crimea + Donbas)	~44,000 km²
Net gain since February 24, 2022	~72,000 km²
Share of Ukraine's total area	~19.3%

Sources: Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia Matters War Report Card Jan. 2026.

2. Value of Territorial Gains in US Dollars

The pre-war average price of Ukrainian farmland from 2021 (approx. 1,400 USD/hectare = 0.14 USD/m²) is used as the benchmark. The controlled area of 116,310 km² corresponds to 11,631,000 hectares.

Valuation	Result
Area in hectares	11,631,000 ha
Average price 2021 (farmland)	1,400 USD/ha
Pure land market value	~16.3 bn USD
Full economic value (raw materials, infrastructure, black earth, minerals)	~100–200 bn USD

Note: The pure land price significantly underestimates the strategic value. The area contains coal and metal complexes (Donbas), the most fertile black earth region, access to the Sea of Azov, as well as gas fields and critical minerals (titanium, rare earths). US Geological Survey estimates put the mineral reserves in the occupied territory at 300–400 bn USD.

3. Land Gains per Soldier Lost

Based on 1.2 million total casualties (killed, wounded, missing – CSIS Jan. 2026, MIVD April 2026, The Economist May 2026):

Calculation	Result
Land market value ÷ 1.2 mn casualties	~13,600 USD / soldier
Full economic value (~150 bn USD) ÷ 1.2 mn	~125,000 USD / soldier

4. Russia's Total War Costs (2022 – Mid-2026)

Cost Category	Estimate (bn USD)
Ammunition (artillery, missiles, drones, bombs)	150–200
Loss & replacement of equipment (tanks, aircraft, ships)	80–120
Personnel costs (pay, combat bonuses, contract fees)	40–60
Death payments and disability pensions for families	20–35
Fuel and logistics	30–45
New procurement / re-production of military equipment	50–80
Construction & fortification in occupied territories	15–25
Medical care (~700,000+ wounded)	10–20
Administration of occupied territories, propaganda	10–20
Intelligence, electronic warfare	15–25
Mobilization costs (recruitment, equipment, training)	20–30
Mercenaries (Wagner et al.), information warfare, other	15–25
TOTAL (average)	~550 bn USD

Sources: Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (550 bn USD through 2025), RAND Corporation, Euromaidan Press (2.7 bn USD/week in 2025).

5. War Costs per Soldier Lost

Calculation	Result
550,000,000,000 USD ÷ 1,200,000 casualties	~458,000 USD / soldier

6. Summary

Overall Key Figure	Value
Territory gained	116,310 km²
Land value (farmland price)	~16.3 bn USD
Full economic value (estimate)	~100–200 bn USD
Total Russian soldier casualties (assumed)	1,200,000
Land market value per soldier lost	~13,600 USD
Full economic value per soldier lost	~125,000 USD
Russia's total war costs (2022–mid-2026)	~550 bn USD
War costs per soldier lost	~458,000 USD

The ratio is economically devastating: for every soldier Russia lost, approximately 458,000 USD in war costs were incurred – to gain land with a land market value of merely ~13,600 USD per soldier. Even at full economic value (~125,000 USD/soldier), the war costs exceed the territorial equivalent by a factor of 3–4.

7. GDP Analysis: How Many Years Does the War Set Russia Back?

7.1 Russia's GDP – Pre-war Decade vs. War Consequences

Russia's GDP stood at around 1.78 trillion USD in 2021. The following table shows real GDP growth in the pre-war decade compared to the war years and the forecast for the next decade:

Period / Year	Real Growth	GDP (bn USD)	Note
2012–2014 (avg.)	+2.0%	~2,100	Before Crimea annexation
2015–2016	−2.2% / −0.2%	~1,370	Sanctions + oil price crash
2017–2021 (avg.)	+1.9%	~1,780	Recovery, COVID dip 2020
Avg. 2012–2021	~+1.2% / year	–	Pre-war reference value
2022	−2.1%	~2,240*	Full invasion, first sanctions
2023	+3.6%	~2,290*	War economy boom
2024	+3.2%	~2,360*	Defense spending as driver
2025	+0.6%	~2,090*	Cooling, key rate 21%
2026 (forecast)	~+1.0%	–	IMF / BOFIT
2026–2035 (avg. forecast)	~+1.0–1.3%	–	IMF / World Bank consensus

* GDP in USD distorted by ruble depreciation. Purchasing power parity (PPP) shows a more stable picture, but structural growth there too remains below pre-war levels.

7.2 Counterfactual Scenario – What Would Have Happened Without the War?

Without the war, Russia could realistically have grown at approximately 2.5% per year with Western economic integration and without sanctions. This contrasts with the actual ~1.0–1.3% per year of the post-war decade:

Scenario (2026–2035)	GDP 2035	Cumulative Difference
A – Without war (counterfactual, 2.5% / yr.)	~2.85 tn USD	Reference value (= 0)
B – With war (realistic, 1.2% / yr.)	~2.37 tn USD	−17% vs. Scenario A
Difference (foregone GDP)	~480 bn USD	Permanent growth loss

7.3 Loss of Labor Force – Demographic Impact on GDP

The 1.2 million casualties affected almost exclusively the most productive age group (20–45 years). Russia's working-age population comprises approximately 75–80 million people.

Labor Force Component	Estimate
Permanently fallen soldiers	~500,000
Permanently war-disabled, unable to work	~200,000–300,000
Highly skilled emigrants since 2022 ("brain drain")	~800,000–1,000,000
Total permanent labor force loss	~1.5–1.8 mn
Share of working-age population	~2.0–2.5%
GDP growth loss due to labor shortage (p.a.)	−0.3 to −0.6%
Russia's labor force need by 2030 (Ministry)	10.9 mn additional

Sources: Russian Ministry of Labor (June 2024), Euromaidan Press (Dec. 2025), Institut Montaigne, Maxwell School (Syracuse University).

7.4 How Many Years Has the Russian Economy Been Set Back?

Factor	Damage Level	Equivalent in Years
Direct war costs (550 bn USD)	~28–30% of annual GDP	8–10 years of growth
Foregone GDP through growth gap (1.3% instead of 2.5%)	~480 bn USD by 2035	~5–6 years behind
Permanent labor force loss (1.5–1.8 mn)	−0.3–0.6% GDP / year	~10–15 years of potential loss
Technology gap (no Western chips, AI, capital)	difficult to quantify	5–10 years of innovation
TOTAL ECONOMIC SETBACK	~1–1.3 tn USD cumulative	10–15 years (conservative)

7.5 Can Russia Call Itself a Victor?

The overall picture based on economic indicators is clear: the war is a loss-making venture for Russia by every economic benchmark. This analysis follows exclusively an economic methodology; political value judgments on the conflict are not the subject of this study and are deliberately excluded.

Costs exceed gains by a factor of 3–50: Even at the full economic value of the territory gained (~200 bn USD), war costs of ~550 bn USD stand in contrast. Adding opportunity costs and labor force losses, the factor rises to 1:10 to 1:50.

Demographic collapse of a generation: 1.2 million casualties – predominantly men aged 20–45 – represent the most severe demographic bloodletting for Russia since World War II. This generation is missing as a labor force, as fathers, as innovators for decades to come.

Technological and economic isolation: Exclusion from Western capital, technology, and know-how delays Russia's modernization by an estimated 5–10 years – in a global competition where standing still means falling behind.

Perpetual fiscal constraint: Defense spending of 7–8% of GDP permanently displaces investment in education, infrastructure, and research.

10–15 years of economic setback: By conservative estimates, Russia has lost 10–15 years of economic development through the war – a bill that future generations will pay.

8. The Russian Stock Market (MOEX) – Development During the War

The Russian stock index MOEX (Moscow Exchange Index, IMOEX) has experienced a dramatic roller coaster since the start of the war. The following overview shows price performance and valuation metrics since 2020:

Year / Period	MOEX Points (approx.)	Annual Perf.	P/E Ratio	Comment
Early 2020	~2,900	–	~5–6x	Before COVID crash
End 2020	~3,289	+8%	~6–7x	Record high at the time
Oct. 2021 (ATH)	~4,288	–	~6–8x	All-time high
Feb. 2022 (war start)	~3,500 → trading halt	−45% (crash)	n/a	Exchange closed for weeks
End 2022	~2,150	~−40% vs. ATH	~4–5x	Sanctions, capital flight
End 2023	~3,169	+47%	~5–7x	War economy rally
End 2024	~2,650–2,800	−10 to −15%	~4–6x	High interest rates (21%), new sanctions
2025 (ongoing)	~2,500–2,800	−7 to −10% vs. prev. yr.	~4–5x	Structural weakness

Sources: Moscow Exchange (MOEX), Investing.com, Trading Economics, Bloomberg. P/E estimates based on aggregated analyst consensus data.

8.1 Corporate Earnings During the War

Sector	Earnings Development	Main Driver
Oil & Gas (Rosneft, Lukoil)	2022 strong ↑, from 2024 ↓	High oil prices 2022–23, then Western sanctions & price cap ($60)
Gazprom	Massive losses from 2023	Halt of gas deliveries to Europe → revenue collapse −80%
Defense & Arms	Explosive profits	State contracts at record levels (defense budget 7–8% GDP)
Sberbank / Banks	2022 losses, recovery from 2023	Western sanctions, then recovery through high-interest environment
Consumer goods / Retail	Declining	Loss of purchasing power, inflation, departure of Western brands
Mining / Metals (Norilsk)	Mixed to declining	Sanctions on palladium/nickel, supply chain disruptions

8.2 P/E and P/B Ratios – Historical Development

Russian stocks were already considered the cheapest equities in the world before the war – a structural discount ("Russia Discount") for political risks, rule of law, and corruption. The war has massively deepened this discount:

Key Figure	2020–2021 (pre-war)	2022 (war start)	2024–2025 (current)
P/E Ratio (Price-Earnings)	~5–8x	~3–5x (volatile)	~4–6x
P/B Ratio (Price-Book)	~0.7–1.0x	~0.4–0.6x	~0.5–0.8x
Dividend yield	~6–9%	Partly suspended	~5–10% (selective)
S&P 500 P/E comparison	~21x	~17x	~22x
Russia discount to world markets	~70%	~80–85%	~75–80%

A P/B below 1.0x means: the market values Russian companies below their book value – an extreme signal of distrust. For foreign investors, the exchange is practically inaccessible (capital controls, frozen accounts).

8.3 Outlook: Russian Stock Market After the War Ends

Sanctions relief scenario: A credible ceasefire could cause the MOEX to rise by 30–60%. P/E expansion from 5x to 8–10x would mean substantial price gains.

But: capital market remains isolated: Western investors cannot practically hold Russian stocks. Frozen portfolios, capital controls, and delistings at international exchanges limit the recovery dynamics.

Structural distrust remains: Nationalizations, lack of rule of law, and arbitrary risks persist even after the war ends – the "Russia Discount" will never fully disappear.

Long-term perspective: Even in the optimal scenario, Russia would likely need 5–10 years to attract significant international capital inflows again. The opportunities for foreign investors in Ukraine are structurally far better.

9. Ukraine – Reconstruction as Europe's Greatest Investment Opportunity

Ukraine offers the largest reconstruction program in Europe since the Marshall Plan after the war ends. According to the World Bank Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5, February 2026), the total need for reconstruction and recovery amounts to:

Needs Category	Need (bn USD)	Priority
Housing (destroyed houses, apartment blocks)	~84	Very high
Transport (roads, bridges, railways)	~78	Very high
Energy & raw materials (power plants, grids)	~68	Very high
Industry & trade	~64	High
Agriculture (mines, soils, equipment)	~55	High
Education, health, social services	~45	High
Other (IT, water, demining, etc.)	~130	Medium–High
TOTAL (RDNA5, February 2026)	~524–588	–

Sources: World Bank / UN / EU RDNA5 Assessment, February 2026. Direct physical damages: 176 bn USD. International pledges to date: 39.3 bn USD (RDNA4). Reparations from frozen Russian assets: up to 300 bn USD potentially available.

9.1 Opportunity Comparison: Ukraine vs. Russian Stock Market

Criterion	Ukraine (after war ends)	Russia (after war ends)
GDP growth potential	7–12% / year for 5–10 yrs. (Poland analogy)	~1–2% / year (structural brakes)
International capital inflows	Massive – EU membership candidate, Marshall Plan effect	Blocked by remaining sanctions, distrust
Valuation level	Extremely favorable after war destruction	Historically cheap, but structurally discounted
Legal certainty / investor protection	EU approximation strengthens rule of law	Remains systemic risk
Reparation inflows	300+ bn USD from frozen Russian reserves possible	Burden from reparation obligations
Reconstruction multiplier	High – every invested dollar generates 2–4 USD GDP	Low – no external refinancing
Conclusion	★★★★★ Strong upside potential	★★ Limited potential

The analogy to Poland in the 1990s is apt: Poland grew after the transformation shock for 15 years at an average of 5–7% p.a. and multiplied its stock market more than 15-fold. Ukraine – with a better starting position in human capital and natural resources, but severely damaged war infrastructure – could experience a similar or faster recovery once security and rule of law are guaranteed.

10. Which Countries and Companies Benefit from Reconstruction?

Ukrainian reconstruction will be handled to a significant extent by European companies. Geographic proximity, existing trade relationships, and sectoral specializations determine who benefits most. Austria and Germany in particular are in an excellent starting position:

Country	Key Companies / Sectors	Positioning
Austria	Strabag (roads, bridges, rail), Wienerberger (bricks, pipes), IT service providers, plant engineering	~200 Austrian companies active; €2.9 bn Austrian state pledges; reconstruction coordinator appointed (Anzengruber). Strongest per capita positioning in Europe.
Germany	Siemens (energy, infrastructure), Heidelberg Materials (cement), BASF (chemicals), Bundesbank/KfW (financing)	German exports to Ukraine +30% in H1 2025 to €4.6 bn; KfW as anchor financier; guarantee program for companies.
Poland	PKO Bank Polski, Budimex (construction), logistics sector, food supply	Direct geographic neighbor; transit country for all goods; BGK as state development bank; ~30% of all freight transport.
France	Bouygues, Vinci (infrastructure), Alstom (rail), Engie (energy)	Anchor financier of EU Flagship Fund; Proparco as development bank.
Italy	Webuild (large structures), Fincantieri (ships/infrastructure), CDP	Active in large infrastructure projects; CDP as development bank partner.
Czech Republic / Slovakia	Building materials, mechanical engineering, steel products	Direct proximity to Poland/Ukraine; supplier function.
USA	Bechtel, Caterpillar, JPMorgan (financing), USAID channels	Politically as main sponsor; private sector via DFC.
United Kingdom	Rolls-Royce (energy), Balfour Beatty (construction)	Post-Brexit independent pledges; part of "London Process" coordination.

10.1 Austria – The Underestimated Reconstruction Nation

Austria holds a structurally outstanding position in Ukrainian reconstruction that extends far beyond its economic size. Strabag – Europe's fourth-largest construction company – has been active in Ukraine for decades and is considered a preferred partner for infrastructure projects. Wienerberger produces bricks and water pipes from plants in Poland/Hungary and is excellently positioned for the housing construction boom. The Austrian government has made institutional provisions by appointing its own reconstruction coordinator (Wolfgang Anzengruber).

EcoAustria estimates the medium-term order volume for Austrian companies at 10–20 bn EUR over the next decade – a transformative growth stimulus for the domestic construction, engineering, and IT sector.

10.2 Germany – Financial Power and Industrial Supplier

Germany combines strong export power with state financing power (KfW). In addition to building materials and energy equipment (Siemens Energy, Enercon), German mechanical engineering and chemical companies benefit. The strategic gambit: Germany finances with public funds (KfW) and receives orders for private companies in return – a proven model from the post-war Marshall Plan.

10.3 The Reconstruction Potential in Context

Reconstruction Key Figure	Value
Total reconstruction need (RDNA5, Feb. 2026)	524–588 bn USD
Direct infrastructure damages	176 bn USD
International pledges to date	39.3 bn USD
Frozen Russian state reserves (potential reparations)	~300 bn USD
Ukraine EU accession – timeline	2027–2030 targeted
Expected GDP growth Ukraine post-war (p.a., years 1–5)	7–12%
Comparison: Poland GDP growth 1995–2005 (avg.)	+5.5% / year
Order volume for Austrian companies (EcoAustria estimate)	10–20 bn EUR / decade
German exports Ukraine (H1 2025)	+30% to €4.6 bn

Sources: World Bank RDNA5 (Feb. 2026), EcoAustria Policy Note 59 (2025), Modern Diplomacy (Jan. 2026), UkraineInvest, EIB, KfW.

Sources

▸ Institute for the Study of War (ISW) / Russia Matters War Report Cards, Jan.–Jun. 2026
▸ The Moscow Times: "Russian Army Makes Biggest Territorial Gains in 2025", 02.01.2026
▸ RAND Corporation: "The Cost of the Ukraine War for Russia", 2023/2024
▸ CSIS: "Russia's Grinding War in Ukraine", January 2026
▸ Euromaidan Press: "Russia spends $2.7 billion weekly on war", 21.12.2025
▸ KyivPost: "Average price per hectare reaches $1,490", 03.08.2021
▸ MIVD (Netherlands): Annual Military Intelligence Report, April 2026
▸ The Economist: Casualties estimate, May 17, 2026
▸ Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZR): Cost estimate $550 bn, 2025
▸ BOFIT Forecast for Russia 2026–2028, Bank of Finland
▸ Institut Montaigne: Demographic impact of war on Russia, 2025
▸ IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2026
▸ Moscow Exchange (MOEX): Historical index data IMOEX 2020–2026
▸ Trading Economics / Bloomberg: MOEX P/E and P/B Ratios
▸ World Bank RDNA5: Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment, February 2026
▸ EcoAustria Policy Note 59: Reconstruction in Ukraine – potential for Austrian companies, 2025
▸ Modern Diplomacy: "Ukraine's Post-War Reconstruction May Fuel Billion-Dollar European Deals", Jan. 2026
▸ UkraineInvest: German companies deepening cooperation for reconstruction, 2024
▸ EIB: EU expands support for Ukraine, 2025
▸ Dnipropetrovsk Investment Agency: Austria strengthens partnership – €2.9 billion in aid, 2025

DISCLAIMER

This document provides a brief economic assessment of the Russia-Ukraine war and was created exclusively for marketing purposes. The information does not constitute financial analysis, investment advice, or a buy or sell recommendation. The information was not prepared in accordance with legal provisions promoting the independence of financial analysis and is also not subject to any prohibition on trading following the dissemination of financial analysis. This publication cannot and is not intended to replace investment advice. The information in this document is based on proprietary analyses as well as external sources that we consider reliable but have not subjected to independent review. We assume no warranty or liability for the accuracy and completeness of the information. The opinions expressed in this document represent exclusively the views of the author and may change at any time; such changes of opinion need not be published. Past performance, simulations, or forecasts are not a reliable indicator of future performance. The value of any investment or income may both fall and rise, and investors may not receive back the total amount invested. Where an investment is denominated in a currency other than the recipient's local currency, changes in exchange rates could have a negative effect on the value, price, or return of that investment.